Book Review by unknown
De Economist (2007) 155:245–247
© Springer 2007DOI 10.1007/s10645-007-9060-3
DE ECONOMIST 155, NO. 2, 2007
BOOK REVIEW
Wim Vanthoor, The King’s Eldest Daughter: A History of
the Nederlandsche Bank 1814-1998, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam,
2005, 408 p. EUR 29.50 (ISBN 9085062004 PB). Dutch version:
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The Nederlandsche Bank, the Dutch central bank, is one of the world’s older cen-
tral banks. Even if its roots do not go as far back as those of Sveriges Riksbanken
or the Bank of England, the Bank will nevertheless celebrate its second centenary in
a few years’ time, in 2014. In the course of the 20th century, a number of histories
of speciﬁc subperiods have been published by the Bank. These are not only quite
detailed, totalling over 5,000 pages, but also follow different approaches. The ﬁrst
one, covering the Bank’s ﬁrst half century, for instance contains no less than 600
pages of ofﬁcial documents,1 whereas in the latest one, on the 1948–1973 period,
these have no more than 20 pages devoted to them.2 In line with this difference, the
latest of those histories pays more attention than the ﬁrst one to the organisation
of the Bank and to discussions in society at large on the Bank’s role. The various
volumes on the subperiods are, unavoidably with publication dates as far as 70 years
apart, quite disparate. A concise history covering nearly the whole period since the
Bank’s start and following a uniform approach is therefore a most welcome addi-
tion to the literature. One might wonder why the Bank could not wait till its sec-
ond centenary, but the year 1998 is a natural dividing line, as it marks the end of
the Dutch guilder as a separate currency. After 1998, the role of the Dutch cen-
tral bank, as part of the European System of Central Banks, became fundamentally
different than in the ﬁrst 185 years of its existence.
Mr Vanthoor’s Leitmotiv is the way the Bank developed into a bankers’ bank and
lender of last resort. The process is sketched against the background of changes
in the ﬁnancial industry and of developments in the Dutch economy in general.
Special attention is given to the interaction between the Bank and the Dutch
government. In particular, the recurring, and often successful, attempts by the Gov-
ernment to reserve itself the right to give the Bank instructions are highlighted.
Vanthoor shows that nearly from the word go tensions ran high every now and
again. Comparisons with other countries are frequently made. We ﬁnd, for instance,
a discussion of the remarkable fact that the Netherlands were more or less unique
in having no other note-issuing banks besides the Nederlandsche Bank. Also, the
1 A.M. de Jong, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bank; Eerste deel: De Nederlandsche Bank
van 1814 tot 1864, 2 volumes, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam 1930.
2 M.M.G. Fase, Tussen behoud en vernieuwing: Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bank 1948–
1973, Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague 2000.
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question why countries all over Europe felt the need for a central note-issuing
institution in the 19th century is touched upon. The Netherlands by the way took
quite long to embrace banknotes. One of the causes, as explained by Vanthoor,
was the high value of the lowest denomination, 25 guilders. Given that the average
workman would consider himself fortunate if he brought home more than 10 guil-
ders a week, this all but precluded households from using banknotes. The business
community was also averse to paper money. Only after the introduction of the sil-
ver standard in 1847 and the consequent withdrawal of gold coins did the demand
for banknotes rise.
Vanthoor notes that Holtrop, the Bank’s governor from 1946 to 1967 (a list of
the Bank’s governors is sorely missing), was almost alone among his colleagues at
the BIS in being well versed in monetary theory. The other central bank gover-
nors were at times unable to understand what he was talking about. His successor
Zijlstra had a similar experience when Minister of Finance in the same period.3
Apparently, in those years professionalism was not everywhere a prerequisite for a
job at the ﬁnancial commanding posts of the economy.
One interesting strand in Vanthoor’s story is the development of the payments
system. A ﬁrst attempt at organising a clearing system was made at the Rotterdam
branch ofﬁce of the Bank in 1879. This functioned for 10 years only, and it took till
1910 before the Bank again offered the commercial banks clearing facilities, again
in Rotterdam. The Dutch clearly were laggards: a clearing house had already been
established in London in 1773. Amsterdam did not follow till 1917. Vanthoor is
mildly critical of the Bank’s lack of initiative in facilitating domestic cashless pay-
ments during the 1960s and early 1970s. Nor does he deem criticisms of, among
others, the Bank’s relative inactivity during its ﬁrst half century, its staying aloof
from the monetary debates during the 1930s, its conduct during the Second World
War and its supervisory role in a couple of bank failures always unjustiﬁed, but his
overall verdict is that the Bank, in his words, “has performed its task as ‘guardian
of the guilder’ properly.”
Inevitably, in a work with such a wide scope one differs with the author at times.
One could, for instance, point out that H. Thornton, who Vanthoor notes was cred-
ited by a French historian with coining the term ‘central bank’,4 was not just an
MP and businessman, but a banker, one of the leaders of the abolitionist (anti-
slavery) movement, the driving force behind a number of NGOs and a ﬁrst-class
monetary theorist. Not immaterial to Vanthoor’s Leitmotiv, Henry Thornton was in
fact the ﬁrst important writer to emphasise the role of the central bank as a lender
of last resort. Further, it does not seem correct that the British wanted a ﬂoating
exchange rate system at Bretton Woods, as Vanthoor would have us believe. Fore-
shadowing the ﬁnal IMF Articles of Agreement, Keynes’ plan for an International
Clearing Union included a ﬁxed-but-adjustable peg system, with the possibility of
parity changes only under strict conditions. Elasticity pessimism was too widespread
3 Cf E. van Lennep and E. Schoorl, Emile van Lennep in de wereldeconomie, Stenfert Kroese,
Leiden/Antwerpen, 1991, pp. 71–72.
4 But where? It is true that Thornton developed the modern view of the functions of a cen-
tral bank, but I cannot ﬁnd the term itself in Thornton’s An Enquiry into the Nature and
Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain nor in his House of Commons testimonials. The
ﬁrst reference to ‘central bank’ in the Oxford English Dictionary is from 1866.
BOOK REVIEW 247
for anyone in Britain, apart from Lionel Robbins, to believe that exchange rate
ﬂuctuations could ensure equilibrium in the foreign exchange market.5 And a pity
something seems to have gone wrong in Table 2.7. But in the context of Vanthoor’s
narrative, these objections are really neither here nor there, and on other points,
such as the discussion whether the shift from bimetallism to the gold standard in
the 1870s was inevitable, he is completely up to date. He admirably succeeded in
transforming a vast wealth of historical material into a well-structured and well-
reasoned story. His book ﬁlls a gap in the literature and provides a lively and emi-
nently readable account of the Bank’s history that should be accessible to non-econ-
omists too.
Hans Visser
5 See the extensive discussion of the development of the British plans in the third volume
of Skidelsky’s epoch-making Keynes biography; R. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting
for Freedom, 1937–1946, Macmillan, London 2000.
